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March-in Rights Under the Bayh-Dole Act: The NIH’s
Paper Tiger?
William O’Brien*
I. INTRODUCTION
The economic malaise of the late 1970s was accompanied by
what many in the public perceived to be a related “technological
1
malaise.” Much of the responsibility for this perceived innovation
stagnation was laid at the doorstep of the nation’s patent policy
which, at the time, vested ownership of patents resulting from
federally-funded research with the government agency responsible
2
for funding the initial research. The government was perceived as
3
ineffective at licensing out its patents to private parties, causing
discoveries derived from federally funded research to rarely make
4
their way to market as commercially useful products. Addressing
these concerns, reformers reasoned that private, not government,
ownership of patents resulting from federally-funded research was
necessary to motivate investment and transform discoveries into
5
commercially useful products. These reforms were manifested in the
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1
See Innovation’s Golden Goose, ECONOMIST: TECH. Q., Dec. 12, 2002, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/1476653.
2
Id.; see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents
and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1663–64
(1996) (describing the perception of government ownership of patents as a
“treacherous quicksand pit in which discoveries sink beyond reach of the private
sector”).
3
Innovation’s Golden Goose, supra note 1 (“Nobody could exploit such research
without tedious negotiations with the federal agency concerned. Worse, companies
found it nigh impossible to acquire exclusive rights to a government-owned
patent.”); Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 1664 (“If the results of federally-sponsored
research were to be rescued from oblivion and successfully developed into
commercial products, they would have to be patented and offered up for private
appropriation.”).
4
Innovation’s Golden Goose, supra note 1 (“[W]ithout that [exclusive licensing]
few firms were willing to invest millions more of their own money to turn a raw
research idea into a marketable product.”).
5
See Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of
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Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 (the “Act”), which allowed small businesses
and academic institutions receiving federal research funds to own any
patents resulting from that research, and to convey exclusive rights to
6
those patents to private firms.
Although the Act’s primary concern was to encourage private
investment and innovation, the Act’s drafters also endeavored to
protect the public from harm, which might result from a private
firm’s nonuse or unreasonable use of an invention that the public
7
had funded.
To that end, the Act contains two significant
8
reservations of government rights. First, the federal government
retains a non-exclusive, non-transferable, royalty-free license to use
9
the patent “for or on behalf of the United States.” Second, the
federal funding agency can, under certain legally prescribed
circumstances, “march-in” and compel the patent holder to grant a
10
license to a “responsible applicant.” The federal funding agency
may exercise its march-in rights sua sponte or at the request of a third
11
party.
An agency may march-in if it finds that “action is necessary to
alleviate health or safety needs which are not reasonably satisfied by
12
the contractor, assignee, or their licensees” or if “the contractor or
assignee has not taken, or is not expected to take within a reasonable
time, effective steps to achieve practical application of the subject
13
invention.” Despite this potentially broad statutory language, no
Biomedicine, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 290 (2003).
6
Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 3015, 3019–28 (1980)
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–12 (2006)).
7
35 U.S.C. § 200 (“It is the policy and objective of the Congress to promote the
utilization of inventions arising from federally supported research or
development . . . [and] to ensure that the Government obtains sufficient rights in
federally supported inventions to meet the needs of the Government and protect the
public against nonuse or unreasonable use of [those] inventions.”) (emphasis added).
8
Id. § 202(c)(4), § 203(a).
9
Id. § 202(c)(4).
10
Id. § 203(a).
11
Id.
12
Id. § 203(a)(2).
13
35 U.S.C. § 203(a)(1). The Act also provides two other circumstances under
which an agency may march-in which are not relevant to this Comment. See id. §
203(a)(3) (providing for march-in rights when “action is necessary to meet
requirements for public use specified by Federal regulations and such requirements
are not reasonably satisfied by the contractor, assignee, or licensees”); id. § 203(a)(4)
(providing for march-in rights when “action is necessary because the agreement
required by section 204 has not been obtained or waived or because a licensee of the
exclusive right to use or sell any subject invention in the United States is in breach of
its agreement obtained pursuant to section 204”).
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federal funding agency has ever exercised its march-in rights. The
only agency which has ever been petitioned under the Act’s march-in
rights provision is the National Institutes of Health (NIH); and, it has
15
declined to do so on four separate occasions.
This has raised
questions regarding whether there are any circumstances under the
Act which would ever prompt the NIH, or another agency, to exercise
16
its march-in rights.
The most recent petition was from a group of Fabry disease
patients which asked the NIH to use its march-in power to address an
17
emergency drug shortage. Fabry disease is a rare genetic disorder
which has only one FDA approved treatment: agalsidase beta, known
18
commercially as Fabrazyme.
Fabrazyme is subject to the Act’s
march-in rights provisions because the NIH funded the initial
19
research that resulted in its discovery. The supply of Fabrazyme was
20
interrupted in June 2009, resulting in massive rationing of the drug
which has caused a resurgence of the patients’ painful symptoms and,
21
allegedly, the deaths of at least three patients. In response to this
health emergency, a group of Fabry disease patients petitioned the
14

Kevin W. McCabe, Note, Implications of the CellPro Determination on Inventions
Made With Federal Assistance: Will the Government Ever Exercise Its March-In Right?, 27
PUB. CONT. L. J. 645, 649 (1998) (“The Government’s march-in right has existed in
relative obscurity—never used and largely forgotten—since 1964.”).
15
See In re Fabrazyme, Manufactured by Genzyme Corp., (Nat’l Insts. of Health,
2010) (determination), available at http://www.ott.nih.gov/sites/default/files
/documents/policy/
March-In-Fabrazyme.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2013) [hereinafter “Fabrazyme
Determination”]; In re Norvir, Manufactured by Abbot Laboratories, Inc., (Nat’l
Insts. of Health, 2004) (determination), available at
http://www.ott.nih.gov/sites/default/files/documents/policy/March-In-Norvir.pdf
(last visited Sept. 23, 2013) [hereinafter “Norvir Determination”]; In re Xalatan,
Manufactured by Pfizer, Inc., (Nat’l Insts. of Health, 2004) (determination), available
at http://www.ott.nih.gov/sites/default/files/documents/policy/
March-in-xalatan.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2013) [hereinafter “Xalatan
Determination”]; In re Petition of CellPro, Inc., (Nat’l Insts. of Health, 1997)
(determination), available at http://www.nih.gov/news/pr/aug97/nihb-01.htm (last
visited Jan. 29, 2012) [hereinafter “CellPro Determination”].
16
See generally McCabe, supra note 14.
17
See Fabrazyme Determination, supra note 15, at 1.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
See Robert Weisman, Genzyme Struggles to Recover From Virus, BOS. GLOBE (Sept.
21, 2009), http://www.boston.com/business/healthcare/articles/2009/09/21
/genzyme_struggles_to_rebound_from_virus_setback/.
21
See Susan Donaldson James, Fabry Disease Patients Get Sicker as Drugs Go Overseas,
ABC NEWS (Aug. 30, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/fabry-disease-patientssicker-sue-drug-company lifesaving/story?id=14403759.
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NIH, requesting that the agency march-in and force the drug’s
manufacturer, Genzyme Corporation, to grant a non-exclusive open
license to a third party who could then begin manufacturing the drug
22
in an attempt to alleviate the shortage.
The NIH denied the
patients’ request on the grounds that the circumstances did not meet
23
the legal standard necessary to warrant a march-in under the Act.
Although Genzyme initially predicted that the shortage would only
24
last six to eight weeks, full production did not resume until March
25
2012.
Scholarly literature on the issue of government march-in rights
has focused largely on the more amorphous question of whether or
not march-in authority can be utilized as a mechanism to enforce
26
drug price controls. There is a dearth of literature, however, on the
narrower question that this Comment seeks to address: given the
NIH’s determinations in the Fabryzyme case and other prior cases,
what circumstances, if any, would ever warrant a march-in in order to
protect the public health and safety? This Comment will argue that
the reasoning relied upon in the NIH’s Fabrazyme determination is
legally incorrect, and, practically speaking, effectively reads march-in
rights as a public protection mechanism out of the Act. This
Comment will demonstrate that the NIH’s interpretation of the Act
ignores both the plain legal standard set forth in the Act itself as well
as congressional intent.
If the NIH changes its interpretation of its march-in authority,
the agency will help to more effectively protect the public in future
22

See Fabrazyme Determination, supra note 15.
Id.
24
See Will There Be One Global Recommendation for Supply Allocation of
Cerezyme® (imiglucerase for injection) and/or Fabrazyme® (agalsidase beta)?, GENZYME SUPPLY
UPDATE (June 24, 2009), http://supplyupdate.genzyme.com/weblog
/recommendation-for-supply-allocation-of-cerezyme-imiglucerase-for-injection1.html.
25
See Sten Stovall, Genzyme Gets Nod From FDA For Plant, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 25,
2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052970203718504577180782783340816.html
(noting
that
full
production is expected to resume in March 2012 given the fact that the FDA
approved the company’s new production facility on Jan. 24, 2012).
26
Cf. John H. Raubitschek & Norman J. Latker, Reasonable Pricing—A New Twist
for March-in Rights Under the Bayh-Dole Act, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH.
L.J. 149 (2005) (arguing that the Act does not require reasonable drug prices); see
generally Peter S. Arno & Michael H. Davis, Why Don’t We Enforce Existing Drug Price
Controls? The Unrecognized and Unenforced Reasonable Pricing Requirements Imposed upon
Patents Deriving in Whole or in Part from Federally Funded Research, 75 TUL. L. REV. 631
(2001).
23
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cases similar to the Fabrazyme case. This Comment will also address
the procedural, regulatory, and political hurdles facing the NIH or
another government agency seeking to exercise its march-in authority
as a means of protecting the public. These procedural hurdles are
great, which makes march-in rights a potentially poor tool for use in
an emergency situation such as the Fabrazyme case. The lengthy
process may, in fact, cause the NIH to adhere to its mistaken legal
interpretation of its march-in authority in future cases where the
public health is threatened. This Comment will advocate that reform
of the Act’s march-in mechanisms is necessary in order to avoid
future tragedies similar to the Fabrazyme situation.
The Fabry disease community was forced to endure a dire health
emergency for nearly three years. The NIH’s abrogation of its legal
duty has, at least in part, contributed to the pain, suffering, and death
of U.S. citizens who would otherwise have had greater access to a
lifesaving drug which was developed with taxpayer dollars. This is
more than a mere mistake of legal interpretation; it is a human
tragedy. If the protection that the Act’s march-in rights provision
provides is insufficient to protect our nation’s citizens from similar
future tragedies, then Congress must reform the Bayh-Dole Act.
Part II of this Comment will detail the history of the Bayh-Dole
Act, focusing on the history of march-in rights and the legislative
intent behind the Act. Part III will set forth the specifics of the Fabry
disease case and present the NIH’s reasoning for declining the
petition to march-in. Part IV will argue that the NIH’s decision in the
Fabry disease case was wrong and that a broader reading of the
march-in rights provision is legally correct and necessary to protect
the public health in similar cases. Part V will examine potential
reforms to the Bayh-Dole Act that are necessary to avoid similar
tragedies in the future given the likelihood that the NIH will
continue to adhere to its mistakenly narrow conception of its marchin authority. Part VI concludes.
II. MARCH-IN RIGHTS AND THE BACKGROUND OF THE BAYH-DOLE ACT
A. March-In Rights History
President John F. Kennedy first attempted to standardize the
27
patent policy of various federal funding agencies in 1963. He issued
a memorandum declaring that the patent rights to all publicly27

See Memorandum and Statement of Government Patent Policy, 28 Fed. Reg.
10,943 (Oct. 12, 1963).

O’BRIEN (DO NOT DELETE)

1408

10/22/2013 2:26 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:1403

funded inventions should generally be vested in the federal
28
The memorandum does, however,
government funding agency.
contemplate narrow situations where it would be in the public
interest to vest principal or exclusive rights in the contractor
29
receiving federal funds. In the event that a contractor were to retain
patent rights, the memorandum noted that the government reserved
the right to compel the contractor (or its grantee, licensee, or
assignee) to grant a license to a responsible applicant on reasonable
terms if such action was necessary “to fulfill health needs, or for other
30
public purposes. . . .”
This policy of maintaining the ability to
compel a patent holder to grant a license based on unmet health or
safety needs is a direct precursor to the march-in rights provision
31
contained in the Bayh-Dole Act. It demonstrates that even before
the Bayh-Dole Act, government agencies were expected to take action
when the unreasonable use or nonuse of an invention, the
development of which was funded by taxpayer dollars, threatened
32
public health and safety.
These reservations of government rights notwithstanding, the
general policy prior to 1980 was retention of patent rights resulting
33
from federally funded research solely by the federal funding agency.
Despite attempts at standardization from both President Kennedy
and President Richard Nixon, by 1980 each federal funding agency
had different regulations and requirements for licensing out its
34
patents.
This confusing regulatory scheme, coupled with the
general ineffectiveness of federal agencies at licensing patents to
private enterprises, resulted in much of the technology derived from
government-funded research going unutilized by private industry and
never making it to market in the form of publicly useful commercial
28

See id. at 10,944.
See id. at 10,945.
30
Id.
31
It should be noted that President Nixon issued a memorandum in 1971
largely reaffirming President Kennedy’s patent policy, including the retained
authority of the government to compel the granting of a license based on unmet
health or safety needs. See Memorandum and Statement of Government Patent
Policy, 36 Fed. Reg. 16,887 (Aug. 26, 1971).
32
Id.
33
Id.; see also James E. Dobkin, Patent Policy in Government Research and Development
Contracts, 53 VA. L. REV. 564, 568–69 (1967).
34
See Barbara M. McGarey & Annette C. Levey, Patents, Products, and Public
Health: An Analysis of the CellPro March-In Petition, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1095, 1097–
98 (1999); Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 1663–64; Ralph C. Nash & Leonard Rawicz,
George Washington University, Government Contracts, Monograph No. 10, Patents
and Technical Data 74–78 (1983).
29
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35

products.
These perceived inefficiencies (whether real or imagined),
coupled with a perceived innovation stagnation and the overall state
36
of the late 1970s economy, led to calls for reform. Reformers in
Congress believed that, in order to more effectively develop the
results of federally-funded research into commercially useful
products, it was necessary to enact a new statutory scheme which
vested these patent rights exclusively in the private sector and allowed
37
for the transfer of these rights to other private entities.
This
solution would serve a number of goals. It would: (1) ensure the
effective transfer and commercial development of patents resulting
from government-funded research; (2) “reinvigorate U.S. industry by
giving it a fresh infusion of new ideas[;]” and (3) “ensure that U.S.sponsored research discoveries were developed by U.S. firms” rather
38
than foreign competitors. The resulting legislation is codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–12 (2006) and is commonly known as
the Bayh-Dole Act.
The Bayh-Dole Act thus established a government-wide policy
that allowed recipients of federal funds to retain ownership of any
39
patents resulting from their research. The stated goals of the Act
are:
to promote the utilization of inventions arising from
federally supported research or development; to encourage
maximum participation of small business firms in federally
supported research and development efforts; to promote
collaboration between commercial concerns and nonprofit
35

See McGarey & Levey, supra note 34, at 1098 n.8 (noting that prior to BayhDole only four percent of all government patents had been licensed). Critics have
argued that this view is “elusive at best” and that prior to Bayh-Dole patent rights
were available to all on a come-one-come-all basis. See Arno & Davis, supra note 26, at
640–41 n.46; see also Tamsen Valoir, Government Funded Inventions: The Bayh-Dole Act
and the Hopkins v. CellPro March-in Rights Controversy, 8 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 211,
239 (2000) (“[I]t is unclear how much, if any, the Bayh-Dole Act has contributed to
the successful commercialization of government funded inventions.”).
36
See Innovation’s Golden Goose, supra note 1.
37
See Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 1663–64.
38
Id. at 1664–65.
39
35 U.S.C. §§ 200–12 (2010). Although the Act initially only allowed small
businesses and non-profit organizations to retain ownership rights in patents
resulting from federally funded research, in 1983 President Reagan expanded the
scope of the Act by executive order to cover all federal government contractors,
including large corporations. See Presidential Memorandum to the Heads of
Executive Departments and Agencies, Subject: Government Patent Policy, 1983 PUB.
PAPERS 248 (Feb. 18, 1983). Congress later codified this policy in 35 U.S.C. § 210(c).
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organizations, including universities; to ensure that
inventions made by nonprofit organizations and small
business firms are used in a manner to promote free
competition and enterprise without unduly encumbering
future research and discovery; to promote the
commercialization and public availability of inventions
made in the United States by United States industry and
labor; to ensure that the Government obtains sufficient
rights in federally supported inventions to meet the needs
of the Government and protect the public against nonuse or
unreasonable use of inventions; and to minimize the costs of
40
administering policies in this area.
In terms of stimulating the commercial development of
discoveries derived from government-sponsored research, the Act has
41
been “consistently hailed as an unqualified success.” The Act has
“fostered a potent four-way partnership between researchers, their
institutions, government, and industry . . . creat[ing] a powerful
engine of practical innovation, producing many scientific advances
that have extended human life, improved its quality, and reduced
42
suffering for millions of people.” The Act is generally credited with
the ten-fold increase in patents granted to universities between 1980
and 1997, compared with a two-fold increase in overall patenting
43
during the same time period. Biomedical research in health-related
fields accounts for a major share of these university patents,
particularly in terms of licensing revenues, a majority of which is
44
publically funded.
While the Act has certainly been successful at its stated goal of
promoting increased commercialization of federally funded
45
research, questions remain as to the ability of the current statutory
scheme to effectuate one of the Act’s primary stated goals: that of
“protect[ing] the public against nonuse or unreasonable use” of
40

35 U.S.C. § 200 (emphasis added).
Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 1708–09. But cf. Arno & Davis, supra note 26, at
640–41.
42
Raubitschek & Latker, supra note 26, at 150.
43
See D.C. Mowery et al., The Growth of Patenting and Licensing by U.S. Universities:
An Assessment of the Effects of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, 30 RES. POL’Y 99, 104 (2001).
44
Id.
45
Id. But cf. Arno & Davis, supra note 26, at 640–41. Many commentators have
also questioned the desirability of fostering such close ties between industry and
academia and argue that Bayh-Dole has fostered an incentive structure which
increasingly encourages universities and other entities to patent “basic research”
which is properly left in the public sphere as patents on such research could hinder
technological progress in the future. See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 290.
41
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46

those inventions. In order to balance the commercial goals of the
Act with the interests of the broader public, the Act contains two
significant reservations of government rights over inventions arising
47
from federally funded research.
First, the federal government
retains a non-exclusive, non-transferable, royalty-free license to use
48
the patent “for or on behalf of the United States.” Second, the
federal funding agency can, under certain legally prescribed
standards, march-in and compel the patent holder to grant a license
49
to a “responsible applicant.” An agency may take action on its own
or upon the request of an interested third party in the form of a
50
petition.
In order to march-in under the Act, one of four legal standards
must be satisfied, two of which are relevant for the purposes of this
51
Comment. The two relevant standards provide that an agency may
march-in if it determines that such action is “necessary” (1) “because
the contractor or assignee has not taken, or is not expected to take
within a reasonable time, effective steps to achieve practical
52
application of the subject invention” or (2) “to alleviate health or
safety needs which are not reasonably satisfied by the contractor,
53
assignee, or their licensees[.]”
The plain language of the Act therefore demonstrates that
march-in rights, along with the ability of the government to use an
46

35 U.S.C. § 200 (2006).
See id. § 202(c)(4), § 203(a).
48
Id. § 202(c)(4).
49
Id. § 203(a).
50
Id. § 203(b).
51
See, e.g., id. § 203(a)(3)–(4). These provisions allow for a march-in when an
agency determines action is necessary (1) “to meet requirements for public use
specified by Federal regulations and such requirements are not reasonably satisfied
by the contractor, assignee, or licensees” or (2) “because the agreement required by
section 204 has not been obtained or waived or because a licensee of the exclusive
right to use or sell any subject invention in the United States is in breach of its
agreement obtained pursuant to section 204.” Id. at § 203(a)(3)–(4). Neither of
these standards involve public health or safety concerns, and are thus outside the
scope of this Comment.
52
The Act defines “practical application” as:
to manufacture in the case of a composition or product, to practice in
the case of a process or method, or to operate in the case of a machine
or system; and, in each case, under such conditions as to establish that
the invention is being utilized and that its benefits are to the extent
permitted by law or Government regulations available to the public on
reasonable terms.
35 U.S.C. § 201(f) (emphasis added).
53
Id. § 203(a)(2).
47
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invention “for or on behalf of the United States,” are the primary
regulatory mechanisms by which the public is to receive protection
from the nonuse or unreasonable use of inventions funded by
54
taxpayer dollars. A review of the bill’s legislative history bolsters this
view, as march-in rights were continually referred to as a means of
55
protecting the public during hearings on the bill. Contemporary
legal scholarship has not addressed what minimum protections the
56
act provides, and has instead focused on the more amorphous
question regarding whether or not the Act can be construed to
57
include things such as price controls for drugs. These questions
aside, the Act’s legislative history and plain language conclusively
demonstrate, at a minimum, that march-in rights were intended to
provide the public with at least some level of protection. The issue this
Comment seeks to address is just how broadly courts and
administrative agencies should read those protections in light of the
text of the Act and its aforementioned history.
B. Procedural Hurdles to Exercising March-in Rights
Federal regulations set forth a detailed, multi-step process for
54

See id. § 202(c)(4), § 203(a).
See Patent and Trademark Law Amendments of 1980: Hearing on H.R. 6933 Before
the Subcomm. on Legis. and Nat’l Sec. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 96th Cong. 135
(1980) (letter from Ralph Nader) (“the present bill relies heavily on such ‘march-in
rights’ to protect the public”); Patent and Trademark Law Amendments of 1980: Hearing
on H.R. 6933 Before the Subcomm. on Legis. and Nat’l Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
96th Cong. 355 (1980) (statement of Mr. Bremer, Pres., Society of Univ. Patent
Administrators) (“the public is adequately protected through appropriate march-in
provisions”); The University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act: Hearing on S. 414
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Congress 56 (1980) (letter from Elmer B.
Staats, Comptroller Gen. of the U.S.):
The Department [of Energy] believes that march-in rights, although
available to the Government for more than 10 years, have not been
utilized because [problems arising from granting patent rights to
government contractors] are illusionary and not actual. If and when
negative effects result from allowing a contractor to retain title to an invention of
commercial importance, march-in rights are there to address them. Otherwise
DOE believes they will never be used.
(emphasis added).
56
See Arno & Davis, supra note 26, at 660 (“Congress uniformly viewed march-in
rights as the mechanism (along with recoupment provisions) to protect the public.”).
57
Id. at 640–41 (arguing that the legislative history of the Act demonstrates that
march-in rights were intended as a mechanism for enforcing reasonable drug
prices). But cf. Raubitscheck & Latker, supra note 26, at 150 (arguing that the marchin rights provision was not intended as a price control mechanism). The NIH
resolved this dispute in Raubitschek and Latker’s favor in rendering its decisions
regarding the Norvir and Xalatan march-in petitions. See discussion infra Part II.C.2.
55
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initiating a march-in proceeding.
The process is lengthy,
potentially making it a poor mechanism to respond to an emergency
60
situation. The procedure is so time consuming, in fact, that some
commentators have suggested that it may effectively defeat the Act’s
substantive goals of protecting public health and safety—goals which
61
are, by their nature, time-sensitive. Some legislators raised similar
concerns regarding the effectiveness of march-in rights as a
protection for the public during Congressional debates. One
Congressman went so far as to describe march-in rights as “a paper
tiger,” and he argued that “we can forget [about march-in rights] as a
62
realistic protection for the public.”
One should be careful, however, not to conflate concerns
58

37 C.F.R. § 401.6 (2012).
The regulations require that when “an agency receives information it believes
might warrant the exercise of march-in rights” (either on its own or, more likely,
upon petition by some party) that the agency “shall notify the contractor in writing of
the information and request informal written or oral comments from the contractor
as well as information relevant to the matter.” Id. § 401.6(b). The agency must
provide the contractor with thirty days to respond. Id. Once the agency receives the
contractor’s response it may initiate march-in procedures within sixty days. Id.
Within thirty days after receiving written notice of the proposed march-in proceeding
the contractor may submit information opposing the proposed march-in. Id. §
401.6(d). If the agency determines that the contractor’s information raises a factual
dispute it must undertake a fact-finding process that gives the contractor the
opportunity to appear with counsel, submit documents, present witnesses, and
question individuals presented by the agency. Id. § 401.6(d), (e). The contractor
may request to present oral and written arguments. Id. Within ninety days after the
completion of the fact-finding or oral arguments the agency must provide a written
decision. Id. § 401.6(g). If the agency decides to exercise its march-in rights the
contractor may appeal to the court of federal claim within sixty days which holds the
agency’s decision in abeyance. Id. § 401.6(j). A decision not to exercise march-in
rights is not reviewable by the courts. 37 C.F.R. § 401.6 (2012).
60
See Information on the Government’s Right to Assert Ownership Control over Federally
Funded Inventions, 2009 WL 2232908, GAO-09-742, 15 (Gov’t Accountability Office
July 27, 2009) (“march-in authority could have limited utility in an emergency
situation, such as an important public health issue” due to the lengthy and time
consuming process of exercising those rights) [hereinafter GAO report].
61
See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 311 (“The tolerance for protracted delays
inherent in the current [march-in] process is at odds with the time-sensitive nature
of the interests reflected in the substantive standard, such as achieving practical
application of the invention ‘within a reasonable time’ and ‘alleviat[ing] health or
safety needs.’”) (citations omitted).
62
See Patent and Trademark Law Amendments of 1980: Hearing on H.R. 6933 Before
the Subcomm. on Legis. and Nat’l Security of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 96th Cong.
55 (1980) (statement of Rep. Jack Brooks, Chairman, Comm. on Gov’t Operations)
(“The Government does not use its march-in rights one in a million times. . . . I
think that it is a paper tiger. I think we can forget [march-in rights] as a realistic
protection for the public.”).
59
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regarding the effectiveness of march-in rights as a protection for the
public with the legal standards set forth in the Act which determine if
a march-in is warranted. Concerns regarding the march-in rights’
procedural hurdles and overall effectiveness as a means of public
63
protection are persuasive evidence in favor of reforming the Act.
These concerns, however, are distinct from the legal issue of what
circumstances should trigger an exercise of the march-in provision
and whether the legal standard set forth in the Act has been properly
understood and applied by the NIH in the Fabrazyme case and other
64
past march-in petitions.
C. Previous March-in Petitions
1. In re Cellpro (1997)
In the 1980s a Johns Hopkins University (“Hopkins”) researcher,
Dr. Curt Civin, isolated an antibody found only on stem cells known
65
as My-10. His research was funded in part by the NIH and resulted
in three patents which had potential application to the treatment of
66
cancer. Separately, researchers at CellPro, Inc. isolated a related,
67
but different, antibody known as the 12.8 antibody.
The 12.8
antibody is structurally similar to the My-10 antibody, but has the
advantage of being able to link physically to baboon cells, which the
68
My-10 antibody is unable to do. This advantage enabled CellPro to
obtain FDA approval for use of its 12.8 antibody in cancer treatments
69
before Hopkins was able to do the same for its My-10 antibody.
Hopkins subsequently sued CellPro alleging willful infringement of
70
its patents.
Before trial, CellPro petitioned the Secretary of the Department
of Health and Human Services, requesting that the Secretary exercise
71
the government’s march-in rights.
The Secretary forwarded the
petition to the NIH because the NIH was the agency that funded the
63

See infra text accompanying note 171.
This Comment will focus on the latter issue. For articles considering the
procedural hurdles, see, e.g., Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 5; GAO report, supra note
60.
65
See Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 303, 309 (D. Del. 1996).
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
See CellPro Determination, supra note 15.
64
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research resulting in the My-10 patents. In the petition, CellPro
sought an order which would require Hopkins to license CellPro the
patents, asserting that such action was necessary because of health
and safety needs or, in the alternative, because Hopkins had failed to
73
achieve practical application of its patents.
First, the NIH determined whether Hopkins had taken effective
74
steps to achieve practical application of the patents. The agency
concluded that Hopkins achieved practical applications because its
sub-licensee, Baxter Healthcare Corporation, was manufacturing a
device based on the patents, despite the fact that the device was still
75
awaiting regulatory approval by the FDA. The agency also cited the
fact that CellPro had failed to negotiate a license from Hopkins,
which the agency felt was persuasive evidence that the free market
76
had decided against the need for CellPro’s product. Second, the
NIH examined whether a health or safety need existed that Hopkins
77
or its licensees/sub-licensees were not reasonably satisfying. The
agency determined that the fact that CellPro had an FDA-approved
medical device on the market was enough to meet the health-need
prong of the march-in rights provision, writing that it would be
“premature[] and inappropriate for the NIH to substitute its
judgment for that of clinicians and patients seeking to avail
themselves of an FDA-approved medical device” and that the device
78
“fulfills a health need for those who wish to use it.” Thus, the NIH’s
bar for what constitutes a “health or safety need” within the meaning
of the Bayh-Dole Act’s march-in provision is extremely low. There
need only be a device or drug on the market that patients wish to use
79
to satisfy that prong, and the NIH will not “substitute its judgment”
for that of clinicians and patients who wish to use the drug or
80
device.
The NIH ultimately determined, however, that the health or
81
safety need was reasonably satisfied in this case. The NIH relied on
the district court, in the patent infringement litigation between
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See CellPro Determination, supra note 15.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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82

Hopkins and CellPro, which had entered an injunction allowing the
continuing sale of CellPro’s cancer treatment device until the FDA
83
approved the Hopkins/Baxter product for sale. The NIH also relied
upon the pledge of Baxter, Hopkin’s sublicensee, to increase patient
access in clinical trials to its device in the event that CellPro reduced
84
the sale of its device.
Therefore, the NIH reasoned, march-in
proceedings were not warranted because Baxter had taken
reasonable steps to satisfy the existing health and safety needs created
85
by the existence of CellPro’s cancer treatment.
Scholarly reaction to the NIH’s CellPro decision has been
86
mixed. Some have applauded the decision as a proper exercise of
restraint, citing the fact that the statutory language of the march-in
provision requires that action must be “necessary” in order to justify
87
the exercise of march-in rights. Others have been more critical,
arguing that the NIH’s determination “not only flies in the face of the
legislative history [of the Act], [but that] it is also flatly inconsistent
with the language of the Act itself, the ‘policy and objective’ of which
88
are explained in the Act’s introductory paragraph.”
Even if one finds the NIH’s decision in the CellPro case
convincing, such support by no means compels the conclusion that
the NIH was similarly correct in the Fabrazyme case because the facts
89
of the two cases are markedly different and easily distinguishable.
First, the cancer patients at issue in the CellPro case had a multitude
90
of different treatment options available, whereas Fabrazyme is the
only treatment available for Fabry disease patients in the United

82

See supra text accompanying note 61.
See Cellpro Determination, supra note 15.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
See, e.g., McGarey & Levey, supra note 34, at 1097–98; Arno & Davis, supra note
26, at 683; see also Peter Mikhail, Hopkins v. CellPro: An Illustration That Patenting and
Exclusive Licensing of Fundamental Science is Not Always in the Public Interest, 13 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 375, 388–89 (2000).
87
See McGarey & Levey, supra note 34, at 1097–98 (describing march-in authority
as a “blunt and powerful means to ensure that government funded technology does
not languish to the detriment of the public”).
88
Arno & Davis, supra note 26, at 683; see also Mikhail, supra note 86, at 388–89
(arguing that the NIH “ignored the link between health needs and usage by
hospitals” in assessing whether or not Baxter’s device, in clinical trial, could be said
to be reasonably satisfying the health need created by CellPro’s device).
89
Compare CellPro Determination, supra note 15, with Fabrazyme Determination,
supra note 15.
90
CellPro Determination, supra note 15.
83
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91

States. Second, there was no evidence that patient access to the
CellPro device had been curtailed, as the district court’s injunction
allowed CellPro to continue selling its device until Baxter achieved
FDA approval and Baxter promised to expand access to its device in
92
clinical trials if CellPro reduced production of its device.
By
contrast, Genzyme Corporation produces the only drug available in
the United States for the treatment of Fabry disease and the drug
93
shortage has limited patient access. Finally, in the CellPro case the
drug producer petitioned the NIH because of impending patent
litigation, whereas in the Fabry disease case a group of patients
94
petitioned due to their lack of access to a lifesaving drug. Thus, the
question presented to the NIH in the CellPro case was a substantially
closer question than in the Fabrazyme case. Even if one supports the
NIH’s decision in the CellPro case, this does not preclude the
conclusion that the NIH’s determination in the Fabrazyme case was
incorrect.
2. In re Norvir (2004) and In re Xalatan (2004)
Both the Norvir and Xalatan petitions challenged dramatic
95
increases in the price of their respective drugs. The primary thrust
of both petitions was that the high prices of these drugs, especially
when considered in light of the already large public investment made
in their development, rendered them essentially unavailable to the
96
public on the “reasonable terms” required by the Bayh-Dole Act.
The petitions also argued, in the alternative, that the dramatic
increase in prices created a public health and safety issue,
97
necessitating a march-in.
Regarding the allegation that the dramatic increase in prices
created a health or safety issue, the NIH’s response in both petitions
was short and practically identical:
[The drug] has been approved by the Food and Drug
91
92
93
94
95

Fabrazyme Determination, supra note 15.
CellPro Determination, supra note 15.
Fabrazyme Determination, supra note 15.
Id.
See Norvir Determination, supra note 15; Xalatan Determination, supra note

15.
96

See Norvir Determination, supra note 15; Xalatan Determination, supra note
15. This argument seems to be modeled after the reasonable pricing theory
advanced in Arno and Davis’s article, discussed supra note 26.
97
See Norvir Determination, supra note 15; Xalatan Determination, supra note
15.

O’BRIEN (DO NOT DELETE)

1418

10/22/2013 2:26 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:1403

Administration as safe and effective and is being widely
prescribed by physicians. . . . No evidence has been
presented that march-in could alleviate any health or safety
needs that are not reasonably satisfied by [Pfizer/Abbot].
Rather, the argument advanced is that the product should
be available at [a lower price/the same price as that
charged in other countries], which is addressed below.
Thus, the NIH concludes that [Pfizer/Abbot] has met the
statutory and regulatory standard for health or safety
98
needs.
The NIH also wrote that “the extraordinary remedy of march-in
is not an appropriate means for controlling prices” and that the issue
99
is “appropriately left for Congress to address legislatively,” which
seems to implicitly reject the argument some scholars have
advanced—that the march-in rights provision was intended as a price100
control mechanism.
In coming to this conclusion, however, the
NIH did not even bother to address the statutory language of the Act,
which requires that results of federal funding be “available to the
101
public on reasonable terms.” As in the CellPro determination, the
NIH in both the Norvir and Xalatan cases seemed more concerned
with upsetting settled expectations of patent holders than in
protecting the public interest.
It is certainly debatable, as a legal matter, whether the march-in
102
provision was intended as a price-control mechanism.
That said,
however, it is worth noting that the NIH did not even mention in its
Norvir and Xalatan determinations the possibility that the
congressional intent and statutory language of the Bayh-Dole Act may
103
require it to protect the public from high drug prices; nor did it
mention its statutory duty to ensure that the products of publicly104
funded inventions are available to the public on reasonable terms.
98

Norvir Determination, supra note 15, at 5; see also Xalatan Determination,
supra note 15, at 5.
99
Norvir Determination, supra note 15, at 5–6. The NIH’s response in the
Xalatan determination was practically identical. See Xalatan Determination, supra
note 15.
100
See Norvir Determination, supra note 15; Xalatan Determination, supra note
15; see also Arno & Davis supra note 26.
101
35 U.S.C. § 201(f) (2006); see also Norvir Determination, supra note 15, at 4;
Xalatan Determination, supra note 15, at 4.
102
See discussion supra note 57.
103
See Xalatan Determination, supra note 15; Norvir Determination, supra note
15.
104
See Xalatan Determination, supra note 15; Norvir Determination, supra note
15.
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Additionally, the NIH wrote off any safety concerns posed by the high
105
price of these drugs in one paragraph. This is persuasive evidence
that the NIH has not seriously considered its march-in authority and
that it is instead more concerned with ensuring that patent holders’
settled expectations remain undisturbed.
III. THE FABRY DISEASE CASE
Fabry disease is a rare, painful, and ultimately lethal genetic
106
disorder. The community of Fabry disease patients recently had to
endure a severe health crisis: the only FDA-approved treatment for
the disease, an enzyme replacement therapy known as Fabrazyme,
went into extremely short supply for nearly three years starting in
107
June 2009.
Fabrazyme was developed with federal funds from the
108
NIH and is subject to the provisions of the Bayh-Dole Act. Despite
the health emergency that this drug shortage caused, the NIH,
responding to a petition by a group of patients in need of greater
access to the drug, refused to exercise the primary public protection
mechanism entrusted to it by the Bayh-Dole Act: the march-in rights
109
power. The Agency’s determination in this case was not only legally
incorrect; it also prolonged the ongoing pain and suffering of the
Fabry disease community. In order to prevent similar drug shortages
in the future, either the NIH must revisit its mistakenly narrow
interpretation of its march-in power, or Congress must reform the
Act to better effectuate its goal of protecting the public health from
the nonuse or unreasonable use of inventions derived from taxpayer
dollars.
Fabry disease is a rare X-linked recessive lysosomal storage
110
disease.
Individuals who suffer from the disease have a deficiency
of the enzyme alpha galactosidase, which normally breaks down a

105

See Xalatan Determination, supra note 15, at 6; Norvir Determination, supra
note 15, at 5–6.
106
Julie K. Karen et al., Angiokeratoma Corporis Diffusum (Fabry Disease), 11
DERMATOLOGY ONLINE J. 4, 8 (2005), http://dermatology.cdlib.org/114
/NYU/NYUtexts/0419054.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2011).
107
See Susan Donaldson James, Fabry Disease Patients Get Sicker as Drugs Go Overseas,
ABC NEWS (Aug. 30, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/
fabry-disease-patients-sicker-sue-drug-company lifesaving/story?id=14403759 (last
visited Sept. 18, 2011).
108
Fabrazyme Determination, supra note 15, at 4.
109
Id. at 1, 9.
110
Karen, supra note 106, at 8.
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111

certain fat known as globotriasylcermide.
The inability to break
down this fat causes it to accumulate in the blood vessels, tissues, and
organs, impairing their functions and resulting in a wide range of
112
symptoms.
These symptoms include renal disease, heart disease,
dermatological problems, ocular disease, burning extremity pain,
113
tinnitus, and an increased risk of stroke. Fabry disease significantly
shortens the life of its sufferers: one NIH study found that fifty
percent of those patients not treated by enzyme replacement therapy
114
developed end-stage renal failure by age fifty-three. All patients in
the study who did live into their fifties eventually developed end-stage
115
renal failure.
Although there is no cure for Fabry disease, an effective therapy
using the biologic agalsidase beta (Fabrazyme) was discovered in
116
2001.
While not a cure, regular infusion of the drug can allow
117
normal metabolism and even prevent disease progression.
The
discovery was a direct result of the NIH’s funding of grant number
DK 34045, awarded to Dr. Robert J. Desnick at the Mt. Sinai School of
118
Medicine.
The resulting patent was exclusively licensed to
Genzyme, Inc., which until 2009 was able to produce enough
Fabrazyme to meet the needs of all Fabry disease patients in the
119
United States.
Fabrazyme is currently the only FDA-approved
enzyme replacement therapy for Fabry disease patients in the United
120
States.
111

Id.
Id.
113
Id.; see also Petition In re Fabrazyme, Manufactured by Genzyme Corp., (Jan.
13, 2010)
p. 3, available at http://patentlawyersite.com/files/Download
/Fabrazyme_Petition_5_0.doc (last visited Nov. 6, 2011) [hereinafter Fabry Disease
Patients’ Petition].
114
Fabry Disease Patients’ Petition, supra note 113, at 3.
115
Id.
116
Id. at 4; see also Fabrazyme Determination, supra note 15, at 6; Fabrazyme
Approval Letter from Steven A. Masiello, Director of the Office of Compliance and
Biologics Quality at the Food and Drug Administration, to Christine Harris, Manager
of Regulatory Affairs at Genzyme Corporation (Apr. 24, 2003), available at
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopeda
ndApproved/ApprovalApplications/TherapeuticBiologicApplications/ucm128159.h
tm.
117
Fabrazyme Determination, supra note 15, at 4–5.
118
Id. at 4. Fabrazyme is therefore an invention subject to the provisions of the
Bayh-Dole Act, which was not disputed by Genzyme or the NIH.
119
Id. at 4–5.
120
Fabrazyme Determination, supra note 15, at 7–9. One other enzyme
replacement therapy, agalside alpha (trade name Replagal) is available outside the
United States and was seeking FDA approval in the United States, but has since
112
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In June 2009, Genzyme was forced to decrease production of
121
Fabrazyme as a result of a viral infection at its manufacturing plant.
In November 2009, Genzyme produced a contaminated batch of the
122
drug.
The FDA initiated action against Genzyme resulted in a
consent decree, $175 million in fines as profit disgorgement, and
123
oversight of the manufacture of Fabrazyme for at least seven years.
In response, Genzyme instituted a rationing protocol, which allotted
Fabry patients with one dose of the drug every other month,
124
compared to the two per month normally prescribed.
Moreover,
125
newly diagnosed patients were not allowed any drug whatsoever.
Genzyme also allocated only thirty-eight percent of what meager
supply of Fabrazyme it had been able to produce to U.S. citizens, with
126
the rest being distributed to other countries.
In response to Genzyme’s production problems, a group of
Fabry disease patients petitioned the NIH requesting that the agency
exercise its march-in rights and grant an open license so that a third
127
party could make up the production shortfall. The NIH denied this
128
request on December 2, 2010.
The primary reason that the NIH
cited was the fact that no third party would likely be able to gain
regulatory approval to produce a drug similar to Fabrazyme before
129
Genzyme could restart production.
The NIH placed particular
reliance upon Genzyme’s predication that supply would be fully
restored in the first half of 2011 and that a competitor, Shire, was
seeking FDA approval of its own enzyme replacement therapy,
130
Replagal.
Despite Genzyme’s promises to the NIH and the Fabry disease
community that it would resume production in early 2011, on March
23, 2011, the company announced that it was pushing back full
resumption of production to the summer of 2011 due to continuing
withdrawn its application. See James, supra note 107.
121
Fabry Disease Patients’ Petition, supra note 113, at 4.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
See Thomas Gryta, Genzyme Sees End to Fabrazyme Rationing, WALL ST. J. (Sept.
16, 2010) http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748703743504575494210148662260.html
125
Id.
126
Fabrazyme Determination, supra note 15, at 7.
127
See generally Fabry Disease Patients’ Petition, supra note 113.
128
See Fabrazyme Determination, supra note 15, at 1–2, 9–10; see also discussion
infra Part IV.
129
Id. at 9.
130
Id.

O’BRIEN (DO NOT DELETE)

1422

10/22/2013 2:26 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:1403

131

viral contamination problems.
Yet again, on August 26, 2011,
production was delayed, with Genzyme issuing an apology to the
132
Moreover, a study by the European
Fabry disease community.
Medicines Agency (EMA) concluded that the pattern of adverse
events the patients were suffering following lowered doses of
Fabrazyme may actually have been an “accelerated[] course of Fabry
133
disease.” The EMA thus required that Genzyme provide enough of
134
Genzyme complied,
the drug to allow full doses to Europeans.
shifting more drugs overseas and away from U.S. patients, despite the
135
availability of Replagal overseas.
Adding to the shortage crisis,
Shire has since withdrawn its application for FDA approval of
Replagal, meaning that there is no chance that U.S. patients will be
136
able to access that drug as the NIH predicted in its determination.
In response to these continuing developments, a group of Fabry
disease patients requested that the NIH reconsider its decision not to
137
march-in. The group has also requested that the FDA ban overseas
shipment of the drug in order to free up more supply for U.S.
138
patients.
Finally, the patients have sued Genzyme for damages,
alleging a novel, implied cause of action arising from the Bayh-Dole
Act: that Genzyme unreasonably used a publicly-funded invention to
139
cause public harm.
They allege that some Fabry disease patients
have died as a result of Genzyme’s drug rationing during the nearly
131

See Robert Weisman, Genzyme Has to Scrap Batch of its Fabrazyme Drug, BOS.
GLOBE (Mar. 23, 2011, 4:30PM), http://www.boston.com/business/ticker
/2011/03/genzyme_has_to.html.
132
See Alina Selyukh, Genzyme Apologizes for a Drug Shipment Delay, REUTERS (Sept.
7, 2011), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/07/genzyme-fdaidUSN1E78613C20110907 (last visited Nov. 6, 2011).
133
See EUR. MEDS. AGENCY, ASSESSMENT REPORT ON THE SHORTAGE OF FABRAZYME 7–
8 (2010), available at http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library
/Other/2010/11/WC500099241.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2012).
134
Id.
135
See Amended Complaint at 9, Hochendoner v. Genzyme Corp., No. 11-0313
(W.D. Pa. Mar. 10, 2011).
136
See James, supra note 107.
137
See Petition for Rehearing and Rulemaking, In re Fabrazyme (Dep’t of Health
& Human Servs. Apr. 5, 2011), http://www.patentlawyersite.com/files/Download
/NIH%20PETITION%20FOR%20RULEMAKING%20AND%20REHEARING%209.
pdf
%20PETITION%20FOR%20RULEMAKING%20AND%20REHEARING%209.pdf; see
also James, supra note 21.
138
See Ed Silverman, Patients Petition FDA over Genzyme Drug Shortage, PHARMALOT
(Jan. 19, 2011, 10:25 AM), http://www.pharmalot.com/2011/01/patients-petitionfda-over-genzyme-drug-shortage/.
139
See Amended Complaint, supra note 135, at 23.
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140

three-year shortage.
The patients’ request for NIH reconsideration has likely been
rendered moot given that Genzyme achieved FDA approval of its new
manufacturing facility in January 2012 and resumed full production
141
in March 2012.
The shortage, therefore, lasted more than a full
year beyond Genzyme’s initial prediction, on which the NIH heavily
142
relied in its decision.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE MARCH-IN PETITION AND NIH DETERMINATION
The NIH determined that exercising its march-in power in
response to health and safety concerns was not warranted on three
143
grounds.
First, the NIH argued that a march-in proceeding
granting license of the Fabrazyme patents to a responsible third party
would not increase the supply of Fabrazyme in the short term
because it would take years for any third party’s production facility to
144
achieve FDA approval. Second, the NIH cited the fact that no third
party had presented itself as seeking FDA approval for an alternative
145
to Fabrazyme. In making this point, the NIH anticipated a counter
argument—that no third party would conduct clinical trials or seek
FDA approval of an alternative to Fabrazyme because this would leave
146
those companies open to a patent infringement suit.
The NIH
responded by arguing that Genzyme’s patents are not an impediment
to a third party seeking regulatory approval because clinical trials are
exempt from infringement under the Hatch-Waxman statutory safe147
harbor provision. Finally, the NIH cited the fact that Genzyme had
140

Id.
See Albertina Torsoli, Sanofi’s Genzyme Receives FDA Approval of Framingham
Plant, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com
/news/2012-01-24/sanofi-s-genzyme-receives-fda-approval-of-framingham-plant.html.
142
See Fabrazyme Determination, supra note 15, at 9 (noting that Genzyme
predicted full production would resume in the first quarter of 2011).
143
See infra text accompanying notes 144–49.
144
Fabrazyme Determination, supra note 15, at 1–2. The NIH emphasized the
difficult and lengthy process of obtaining FDA approval for a biological product such
as Fabrazyme to market, irrespective of any patent rights. Id. Specifically, any new
biological product must complete FDA Investigational New Drug (IND) and Biologic
License Application (BLA) approval processes. See generally 21 C.F.R. §§ 50, 54, 56,
210, 211, 312, 600, 601, 606 (2006) (describing various points of the approval process
facing any organization seeking to produce a Fabrazyme competitor).
145
Fabrazyme Determination, supra note 15, at 1–2.
146
See Fabrazyme Determination, supra note 15, at 1–2.
147
Id. at 1. The Hatch-Waxman statutory safe harbor provision exempts
companies from liability for patent infringement claims if their use is “reasonably
related to the development and submission of information under a Federal law
141
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promised to resume full production of Fabrazyme in the first half of
2011, and that Genzyme was working diligently and in good faith to
148
The NIH also noted, in a break from
make good on its promise.
the previous three decisions, that it would monitor the shortage of
Fabrazyme and re-evaluate its decision if it received information
suggesting either that progress toward restoring the supply of
Fabrazyme to meet patient demand was not proceeding as
represented by Genzyme, or that a third party with a viable plan to
obtain FDA approval to market an alternative to Fabrazyme presented
149
itself.
The NIH’s application of the Bayh-Dole Act’s march-in provision
to the facts of this case was mistaken for several reasons. First, its
reasoning was circular and set up a self-fulfilling prophecy because
the Hatch-Waxman statutory safe-harbor provision extends only to
actions taken to achieve regulatory approval, not to actions taken to
150
bring a product to market.
Thus, to bring a product to market, a
company would have to be granted a compulsory license by the NIH
via a march-in (or perhaps negotiate a license with the patent
holder). Second, the agency’s decision ignores the plain language of
the Act as well as the congressional intent underlying that language.
Third, and similarly, the NIH’s decision effectively defeats one of the
Act’s principal goals—to protect the public from the nonuse or
unreasonable use of publicly funded inventions—by reading the legal
standard in such a way that it can essentially never be met by any set
of facts. If the public is to receive any protection from drug shortages
151
resulting from patent monopolies then either the NIH must reevaluate its mistaken legal reasoning, or Congress must amend the
Bayh-Dole Act to offer greater public protection—lest the
circumstances of the Fabrazyme case be repeated in the future.
The NIH’s reasoning in the Fabrazyme determination is circular
because it places primary emphasis on the fact that no third party had
presented itself as ready to achieve regulatory approval for an
which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological
products.” See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006) (commonly known as the HatchWaxman Safe Harbor Provision). Thus, as per the NIH’s reasoning, a company
seeking FDA approval of a Fabrazyme competitor would not have to fear a patent
infringement suit brought by Genzyme because they would be protected by HatchWaxman while they were developing the drug. See generally Merck KGaA v. InTegra
LifeSciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 202–03 (2005).
148
Fabrazyme Determination, supra note 15, at 1–2.
149
Id.
150
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
151
These are drugs whose development was funded by the public, no less.
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alternative to Fabrazyme. But, in refusing to march-in on those
grounds, the NIH effectively created a situation where no third party
will ever present itself—a self-fulfilling prophecy. The NIH argued
that a third party should be willing to seek FDA approval of a
competing drug even without a march-in because it can do so without
fear of a patent infringement suit under the Hatch-Waxman statutory
152
safe-harbor provision.
The NIH’s reasoning, however, overlooks
the fact that simply because a company hypothetically could seek FDA
approval without infringing upon the Fabrazyme patents and then
request a march-in does not by extension mean that a company will
do so. Indeed, companies will almost certainly not seek regulatory
approval of a competing product absent a march-in first because
bringing a product to market is not exempt from patent infringement
153
suits by the safe-harbor provision.
Although the Hatch-Waxman
safe-harbor provision exempts actions that are related to seeking
regulatory approval, that safety does not extend to selling the product
154
on the open market after regulatory approval is achieved.
Thus,
the NIH expects a company to seek FDA approval of a competing
(and patent-infringing) drug, and then request that the NIH marchin and compel the granting of a patent license so it can sell its drug
on the open market. This asks a company to take on the great risk of
investing a large sum of money in achieving regulatory approval and
then hoping that the NIH marches-in and grants a compulsory
license. Especially in light of the fact that no government agency has
155
ever used its march-in authority, it should not be surprising that no
company has endeavored to do this, thereby fulfilling the NIH’s
156
prophecy.
Certainly, a march-in would not guarantee that a third party
would immediately present itself as ready and willing to produce a
competing product. But marching-in first, before a company decides
to seek regulatory approval, dramatically lessens the risk that any
152

See supra text accompanying note 147.
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
154
See id. (exempting companies from liability for patent infringement claims if
their actions are “reasonably related to the development and submission of
information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of
drugs or veterinary biological products”).
155
See McCabe, supra note 14, at 649.
156
Indeed, the NIH’s determination seems to implicitly recognize this, stating
that it will reconsider its decision “in the unlikely event” that they receive information
that a third party has presented itself as ready and willing to seek regulatory approval
of a competing drug. Fabrazyme Determination, supra note 16, at 2 (emphasis
added).
153
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company contemplating this course of action would have to take on,
and would therefore drastically increase the chances that such a
company might present itself. Thus, the NIH’s reasoning is circular:
by declining to march-in until a third party has presented itself, it has
effectively guaranteed that no such party will ever appear. This limits
the scope of march-in authority so drastically as to effectively read it
out of the Bayh-Dole Act.
The NIH’s reasoning also ignores the Bayh-Dole Act’s plain
language and Congress’s intent. As a preliminary matter, the
underproduction of Fabrazyme clearly constitutes a “health or safety
157
need[]” within the meaning of the Act.
This view is supported by
the NIH’s determination in the CellPro case, where the agency
determined that the choice of any patient or doctor to utilize a
particular product creates a health or safety need, and that the NIH
158
will not second guess these decisions.
It is also clear that these
159
health and safety needs are not being “reasonably satisfied” by
Genzyme, as the underproduction of Fabrazyme has allegedly
resulted in an accelerated course of the disease and the deaths of
160
three patients.
Although not clearly stated by the NIH, the only
limiting language available in the Act to support the view that a
march-in is not appropriate is the requirement that action on the
part of the federal funding agency be “necessary to alleviate” the
161
unmet health or safety needs.
The NIH, in stating that it will not
march-in absent a third party achieving regulatory approval of a
competing drug, is interpreting the Act to require that the agency be
the last party to take action in the multi-step process required to
bring a competing drug to market. Thus, the NIH is interpreting
“necessary” as meaning strictly necessary.
This interpretation of when action is “necessary” is not a valid
means of statutory interpretation. Such an interpretation would
make action on the part of the NIH both necessary and sufficient to
162
alleviate the unmet health need. Regardless of the fact that there is
157

35 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2).
See supra text accompanying notes 77–80.
159
35 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3).
160
See Fabry Patients’ Petition, supra note 113.
161
35 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2).
162
Additionally, this author could find no cases in any context which have
construed a statute’s use of the word “necessary” to mean absolutely necessary.
Indeed, in the context of constitutional law the Supreme Court has written that “the
word ‘necessary’ does not mean ‘absolutely necessary.’” United States v. Comstock,
130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010) (discussing the Necessary and Proper clause).
158
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no third party, a march-in is still a necessary (though not sufficient)
predicate action to allow any third party, whether present or not, to
legally produce a Fabrazyme competitor. Without an exercise of the
NIH’s march-in authority, the health and safety needs of the Fabry
community will go unmet, and action by the NIH is “necessary” to
alleviate those needs. In fact, considering the history of march-in
proceedings since Bayh-Dole’s enactment, most third parties would
be right to assume that the NIH will never march in, and thus decide
not to attempt to produce a Fabrazyme competitor because the
chance of receiving a compelled license via a march-in is effectively
zero. Therefore, the NIH’s granting of an open license under its
march-in authority is “necessary” in order to motivate third parties.
The NIH, however, did not engage in such a close examination
of the statutory language in deciding the scope of its march-in
authority, and instead simply stated that a march-in was not
163
appropriate. Notwithstanding its limited analysis, its determination
still ignored the Act’s clear congressional intent. One of the Act’s
principal goals, expressed in the “Policy and Objective” section, is to
“protect the public against the nonuse or unreasonable use of
164
inventions . . . .”
As noted, the Act’s sponsors viewed march-in
165
rights as the primary mechanism to effectuate this goal. The Act’s
proponents argued that “the public is adequately protected through
166
In commenting on the bill, the
appropriate march-in provisions.”
Department of Energy viewed a march-in as unlikely, but noted that
“[i]f and when negative effects result from allowing a contractor to
retain title to an invention of commercial importance, march-in
167
rights are there to address them.” Contemporary legal scholarship,
163

See Fabrazyme Determination, supra note 15.
35 U.S.C. § 200.
165
See discussion supra note 55.
166
Patent and Trademark Law Amendments of 1980: Hearing on H.R. 6933 Before the
Subcomm. on Legis. and Nat’l Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 355
(1980) (statement of Mr. Bremer, Pres., Soc’y of Univ. Patent Adm’rs) (“the public is
adequately protected through appropriate march-in provisions”).
167
The University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act: Hearing on S. 414 Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Congress 56 (1980) (letter from Elmer B. Staats,
Comptroller Gen. of the U.S.). Mr. Staats further elaborated that:
The Department [of Energy] believes that march-in rights, although
available to the Government for more than 10 years, have not been
utilized because [problems arising from granting patent rights to
government contractors] are illusionary and not actual. If and when
negative effects result from allowing a contractor to retain title to an invention of
commercial importance, march-in rights are there to address them. Otherwise
DOE believes they will never be used.
164
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in reviewing the legislative history of the Act, has similarly concluded
that march-in rights were viewed as the primary means of protecting
168
In the Fabry case, the unreasonable use of a federally
the public.
funded invention caused a great health and safety need, but the NIH
ignored the primary mechanism inserted into the Act to ensure such
need was met. The NIH’s interpretation of its legal authority has
thus defeated the public protection goal of the Act by ignoring the
mechanism intended to further that goal.
The NIH, however, has the ability to correct its mistaken
interpretation. The agency has been petitioned by the Fabry patients
again, requesting a reconsideration of the march-in determination
169
and a rule clarification.
At this point, given that the FDA has
cleared Genzyme’s new production facility, an NIH march-in is
almost certain not to occur. The NIH should, however, issue a rule
clarification correcting its prior mistaken determination in order to
send a message that the Bayh-Dole Act’s public protection measures
are functional and to make clear that it will exercise its march-in
authority in future drug-shortage cases. The NIH should do so not
only because its legal determination was incorrect, but because two
factual assumptions upon which it heavily relied (that Genzyme
would resume full production in the first half of 2011 and that
Replagal would be made widely available in the United States) were
170
proven to be completely wrong.
A reconsideration of its
determination will at least serve as a reminder to other holders of
publically funded patent monopolies that if they abuse the invention
which has been entrusted to them by taxpayers the NIH still has the
will to march-in. If the NIH adheres to its mistaken view it will have
sent a message to pharmaceutical companies everywhere that in the
event of a large-scale drug shortage their patents are not in danger.

Id. (emphasis added).
168
See Tamsen Valoir, Government Funded Inventions: The Bayh-Dole Act and the
Hopkins v. CellPro March-in Rights Controversy, 8 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 211, 218–19
(2000) (arguing that balancing public versus private benefits is a primary concern of
the Bayh-Dole Act and that march-in rights exist in order to protect the public
welfare).
169
See In re Fabrazyme, supra note 137, at 3; see also James, supra note 21.
170
Compare Fabrazyme Determination, supra note 15, at 2 (noting that Genzyme
had promised to resume full production in the first half of 2011), with Stovall, supra
note 25 (noting that full production of Fabrazyme will not resume until at least
March 2012): also compare Fabrazyme Determination, supra note 15, at 7 (noting that
Shire was seeking FDA approval for its Fabry disease treatment, Replagal) with James,
supra note 107 (noting that Shire has withdrawn its application for FDA approval of
Replagal).
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A return to the Act’s original intent will provide additional
motivation to holders of publicly funded patent monopolies to avoid
the mistakes made by Genzyme.
V. BAYH-DOLE REFORM
Unfortunately, the possibility of the NIH revisiting its
determination to correct its mistaken legal interpretation of its
march-in authority may fairly be described as unlikely, at best. The
NIH’s likely adherence to its mistaken interpretation of its legal
authority, coupled with the lengthy procedure required to exercise
the march-in power, demonstrates the need for reform.
As noted, the lengthy march-in procedure limits its utility in an
171
emergency situation, such as a drug shortage. Especially when one
172
considers that FDA approval would have to be satisfied as well as the
march-in procedures, the ability of the Act’s march-in rights provision
to offer adequate public protections in public health emergencies is
173
even more severely curtailed.
The Fabry disease community’s
plight is a vivid illustration of this. The mistaken determination by
the NIH, coupled with the march-in right’s limited utility in an
emergency situation, served to defeat the ability of the Act to
effectuate its goal of protecting the public health and safety. Indeed,
it seems as though the fears that the Act’s detractors expressed while
the Act was before Congress have been wholly realized: march-in
rights have become nothing more than a “paper tiger,” offering the
public nothing more than the appearance of protection from misuse
174
of the inventions it funded.
While march-in rights may have
previously existed as an existential threat to patent holders after the
171

See supra text accompanying note 59 describing the march-in procedure.
See supra text accompanying note 144 describing the FDA-approval process.
173
See GAO report, supra note 60, at 15 (“March-in authority could have limited
utility in an emergency situation such as an important public health issue.”);
McGarey & Levey, supra note 34, at 1100–10 (“In a case where march-in was justified
by a health care emergency, the administrative process would likely not be
expeditious enough to address the situation.”); Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 290
(“The tolerance for protracted delays inherent in the current process is at odds with
the time-sensitive nature of the interests reflected in the substantive standard, such as
achieving practical application of the invention ‘within a reasonable time’ and
‘alleviating health or safety needs.’”).
174
See Patent and Trademark Law Amendments of 1980: Hearing on H.R. 6933 Before
the Subcomm. on Legis. and Nat’l Sec. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 96th Cong.. 55
(1980) [hereinafter Patent and Trademark Law Amendments of 1980] (statement of Rep.
Jack Brooks, Chairman, Comm. on Gov’t Operations) (“The Government does not
use its march-in rights one in a million times. . . . I think that it is a paper tiger. I
think we can forget [march-in rights] as a realistic protection for the public.”).
172

O’BRIEN (DO NOT DELETE)

1430

10/22/2013 2:26 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:1403

Fabrazyme decision, it is probably safe for the current holders of
publicly funded patents to conclude that they have nothing to fear
from the march-in provision—that the provision constitutes nothing
more than an empty threat which will never actually be exercised, no
matter how egregious the harm being inflicted upon the public
health and safety.
While the public derives substantial benefit from the Bayh-Dole
Act’s success in increasing commercialization of publicly funded
175
research, taxpayers also deserve at least some sort of functional
mechanism to protect them from the “unreasonable use” of
inventions funded by taxpayer dollars, especially when such use
threatens the public health and safety. If the NIH refuses to ever
utilize the primary mechanism intended for that purpose—either out
of concern for the length of the proceedings or sheer lack of political
will—then the public has no such protection. Accordingly, Congress
should enact modest reforms of the Act aimed at two goals: (1)
specifying with greater clarity what circumstances warrant a march-in;
and (2) streamlining the procedural hurdles currently encumbering
the decision to move forward with a march-in, especially in cases
where the public health or safety is threatened, such as a drug
176
shortage like the Fabrazyme case.
In the case of a future drug shortage similar to the Fabrazyme
case, Congress should specify whether or not the presence of a third
party manufacturer is a necessary pre-condition to a march-in.
Additionally, in these cases, Congress should consider putting in
place a procedure under which the NIH and the FDA can work
cooperatively. In the Fabrazyme case, for instance, the hurdles of
achieving FDA approval for an alternative to Fabrazyme likely
prevented a third party from seeking a patent license compelled by
177
the NIH via a march-in.
In cases where a proven, effective drug
already exists but is in short supply, Congress should contemplate
enacting a shorter route to FDA approval by a third party who
receives a patent license via a march-in in order to restore the drug
supply as quickly as possible. This should not raise substantial
175

See McCabe, supra note 14, at 665–66 (arguing that the public receives
substantial long term benefits from increased commercialization of publically funded
research in the form of greater technological development).
176
See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 311 (arguing that the requirement that
march-in authority be held in abeyance pending exhaustion of all court appeals by
government contractor should be changed).
177
The route to FDA approval for a biological product “highly similar” to a
product already on the market is currently governed by 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2010).
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concerns for investors, as march-ins would continue to be rare so
long as companies avoid undersupplying the market—something
178
Additionally, under
already in their best interest anyway.
circumstances like the Fabry disease case, the NIH could attach
reasonable royalty terms to any license compelled under a march-in
to further defray the risk of lost profits in the event of a drug
shortage.
Congress should also streamline the current march-in
procedure, at least in cases where the public health or safety is
threatened. Indeed, as noted previously, the current procedure
actually serves to defeat the Act’s goal of protecting the public health
179
and safety.
These reforms are modest but would go a long way
towards restoring the Act’s ability to effectuate its goal of protecting
the public. Without these reforms, or the NIH showing greater
political will to correct its mistaken legal interpretation of the current
march-in-provision, the march-in rights provision can no long be
180
honestly described “as a realistic protection for the public.”
VI. CONCLUSION
In retaining march-in rights over federally funded research,
Congress endeavored to balance private interests with those of the
public. While the Bayh-Dole Act has certainly been successful at one
of its primary goals—commercializing the products of federally
funded research—the Fabryazme case demonstrates its failure in
effectuating another primary goal: protecting the public health and
safety from the nonuse or unreasonable use of inventions funded by
taxpayer dollars. This failure is a product of both the NIH’s mistaken
legal interpretation of the Act and the burdensome nature of the
march-in process. The statutory authority does exist for the NIH to
march-in in the Fabrazyme case, despite its failure to do so. This case
is precisely the type of situation Congress intended to remedy by

178

See GAO report, supra note 60, at 15 (arguing that the potential for an agency
march-in is far less important to investors than other risks faced when deciding
whether or not to invest in a product, and noting that investors believe that so long
as march-ins are rare and licensees are careful to follow the requirements of the
Bayh-Dole Act, the flow of federally funded inventions to market should not be
negatively impacted).
179
See discussion supra note 61.
180
See Patent and Trademark Law Amendments of 1980 (statement of Rep. Jack
Brooks, Chairman, Comm. on Gov’t Operations) (“The Government does not use its
march-in rights one in a million times. . . . I think that it is a paper tiger. I think we
can forget [march-in rights] as a realistic protection for the public.”).
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providing for march-in rights. Accordingly, the NIH should reevaluate its determination upon the Fabry patients’ rehearing request
and issue a rule clarification.
Absent such a rule clarification by the NIH, Congress should
reform the Bayh-Dole Act to clarify when a march-in is warranted
and, most importantly, to streamline the process for doing so. Such
reforms would be modest and should be targeted at ensuring that
statutorily conferred monopolies over life-saving treatments derived
from federally funded research are not withheld from the public
again, either intentionally or through negligent mistakes in
production. Without these reforms, or a showing of great political
will by the NIH to correct its legal mistake, march-in rights will cease
to be even a “paper tiger,” and will offer the public no greater
protection than mere paper.

